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In recent years, bullying and aggression against social media users
have grown signicantly, causing serious consequences to victims
of all demographics. Nowadays, cyberbullying aects more than
half of young social media users worldwide, suering from pro-
longed and/or coordinated digital harassment. Also, tools and
technologies geared to understand and mitigate it are scarce and
mostly ineective. In this paper, we present a principled and scal-
able approach to detect bullying and aggressive behavior on Twit-
ter. We propose a robust methodology for extracting text, user,
and network-based attributes, studying the properties of bullies
and aggressors, and what features distinguish them from regular
users. We nd that bullies post less, participate in fewer online
communities, and are less popular than normal users. Aggressors
are relatively popular and tend to include more negativity in their
posts. We evaluate our methodology using a corpus of 1.6M tweets
posted over 3 months, and show that machine learning classica-
tion algorithms can accurately detect users exhibiting bullying and
aggressive behavior, with over 90% AUC.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cyberbullying and cyberaggression are serious and widespread is-
sues aecting increasingly more Internet users. Arguably, in today’s
hyper-connected society, bullying, once limited to particular places
or times of the day (e.g., school hours), can instead occur anytime,
anywhere, with just a few taps on a keyboard. Cyberbullying and
cyberaggression can take many forms and denitions [19, 46, 52],
however, the former typically denotes repeated and hostile behav-
ior performed by a group or an individual and the latter intentional
harm delivered via electronic means to a person or a group of peo-
ple who perceive such acts as oensive, derogatory, harmful, or
unwanted [19].
Only a few years ago, when Internet adoption was still limited,
cyberbullying was not taken seriously: the typical advice was to
“just turn o the screen” or “disconnect” [33]. However, as its
proliferation and the extent of its consequences reach epidemic
levels [4], this behavior can no longer be ignored: in 2014, about
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50% of young social media users reported being bullied online in
various forms [47]. Popular social media platforms like Twitter and
Facebook are not immune [43], as racist and sexist attacks may
even have caused potential buyers of Twitter to balk [51].
In this paper, we focus on these phenomena on Twitter. Despite
the seriousness of the problem, there are very few successful ef-
forts to detect abusive behavior on Twitter, both from the research
community (see Section 2) and Twitter itself [50], due to several
inherent obstacles. First, tweets are short and full of grammar and
syntactic aws, which makes it harder to use natural language pro-
cessing tools to extract text-based attributes and characterize user
interactions. Second, each tweet provides fairly limited context,
therefore, taken on its own, an aggressive tweet may be disregarded
as normal text, whereas, read along with other tweets, either from
the same user or in the context of aggressive behavior from multiple
users, the same tweet could be characterized as bullying. Third, de-
spite extensive work on spam detection in social media [18, 48, 55],
Twitter is still full of spam accounts [10], often using vulgar lan-
guage and exhibiting behavior (repeated posts with similar content,
mentions, or hashtags) that could also be considered as aggressive
or bullying. Filtering out such accounts from actual abusive users
may be a dicult task. Finally, aggression and bullying against an
individual can be performed in several ways beyond just obviously
abusive language – e.g., via constant sarcasm, trolling, etc.
Overview & Contributions. In this paper, we design and execute
a novel methodology geared to label aggressive and bullying behav-
ior in Twitter. Specically, by presenting a principled and scalable
approach for eliciting user, text, and network-based attributes of
Twitter users, we extract a total of 30 features. We study the prop-
erties of bullies and aggressors, and what features distinguish them
from regular users, alongside labels provided by human annotators
recruited from CrowdFlower [13], a popular crowdsourcing plat-
form. Such labels, contributed infrequently or at regular intervals,
can be used to enhance an already trained model, bootstrapping
the detection method and executed on large set of tweets.
We experiment with a corpus of 1.6M tweets, collected over 3
months, nding that bully users are less “popular” and participate
in fewer communities. However, when they do become active, they
post more frequently, and use more hashtags, URLs, etc., than oth-
ers. Moreover, we show that bully and aggressive users tend to
attack, in short bursts, particular users or groups they target. We
also nd that, although largely ignored in previous work, network-
based attributes are actually the most eective features for detecting
aggressive user behavior. Our features can be fed to classication
algorithms, such as Random Forests, to eectively detect bullying
and aggressive users, achieving up to 0.907 weighted AUC [21],
89.9% precision, and 91.7% recall. Finally, we discuss the eective-
ness of our methods by comparing results with the suspension and
deletion of accounts as observed in the wild for users who, though
aggressive, remain seemingly undetected by Twitter. Our datasets
are available to the research community upon request.
2 RELATEDWORK
Over the past few years, several techniques have been proposed
to measure and detect oensive or abusive content / behavior on
platforms like Instagram [25], YouTube [11], 4chan [23], Yahoo
Finance [17], and Yahoo Answers [28]. Chen et al. [11] use both
textual and structural features (e.g., ratio of imperative sentences,
adjective and adverbs as oensive words) to predict a user’s apti-
tude in producing oensive content in YouTube comments, while
Djuric et al. [17] rely on word embeddings to distinguish abusive
comments on Yahoo Finance. Nobara et al. [36] perform hate speech
detection on Yahoo Finance and News data, using supervised learn-
ing classication. Kayes et al. [28] nd that users tend to ag abusive
content posted on Yahoo Answers in an overwhelmingly correct
way (as conrmed by human annotators). Also, some users signi-
cantly deviate from community norms, posting a large amount of
content that is agged as abusive. Through careful feature extrac-
tion, they also show it is possible to use machine learning methods
to predict which users will be suspended.
Dinakar et al. [16] detect cyberbullying by decomposing it into
detection of sensitive topics. They collect YouTube comments from
controversial videos, use manual annotation to characterize them,
and perform a bag-of-words driven text classication. Hee et al. [54]
study linguistic characteristics in cyberbullying-related content
extracted from Ask.fm, aiming to detect ne-grained types of cyber-
bullying, such as threats and insults. Besides the victim and harasser,
they also identify bystander-defenders and bystander-assistants,
who support, respectively, the victim or the harasser. Hosseinmardi
et al. [25] study images posted on Instagram and their associated
comments to detect and distinguish between cyberaggression and
cyberbullying. Finally, authors in [44] present an approach for
detecting bullying words in tweets, as well as demographics about
bullies such as their age and gender.
Previous work often used features such as punctuation, URLs,
part-of-speech, n-grams, Bag of Words (BoW), as well as lexical
features relying on dictionaries of oensive words, and user-based
features such as user’s membership duration activity, number of
friends/followers, etc. Dierent supervised approaches have been
used for detection: [36] uses a regression model, whereas [14, 16, 54]
rely on other methods like Naive Bayes, Support Vector Machines
(SVM), and Decision Trees (J48). By contrast, Hosseinmardi et
al. [24] use a graph-based approach based on likes and comments
to build bipartite graphs and identify negative behavior. A similar
graph-based approach is also used in [25].
Sentiment analysis of text can also contribute useful features
in detecting oensive or abusive content. For instance, Nahar et
al. [34] use sentiment scores of data collected from Kongregate
(online gaming site), Slashdot, and MySpace. They use a probabilis-
tic sentiment analysis approach to distinguish between bullies and
non-bullies, and rank the most inuential users based on a predator-
victim graph built from exchanged messages. Xu et al. [56] rely on
Figure 1: Overview of our methodology. N denotes the abil-
ity to parallelize a task on N processors.
sentiment to identify victims on Twitter who pose high risk to them-
selves or others. Apart from using positive and negative sentiments,
they consider specic emotions such as anger, embarrassment, and
sadness. Finally, Patch [38] studies the presence of such emotions
(anger, sadness, fear) in bullying instances on Twitter.
Remarks. Our work advances the state-of-art on cyberbullying
and cyberaggression detection by proposing a scalable methodology
for large-scale analysis and extraction of text, user, and network
based features on Twitter, which has not been studied in this context
before. Our novel methodology analyzes users’ tweets, individually
and in groups, and extracts appropriate features connecting user
behavior with a tendency of aggression or bullying. We examine
the importance of such attributes, and further advance the state-
of-art by focusing on new network-related attributes that further
distinguish Twitter-specic user behaviors. Finally, we discuss the
eectiveness of our detection method by comparing results with
the suspension and deletion of accounts as observed in the wild for
users who, though aggressive, remain seemingly undetected.
3 METHODOLOGY
Our approach to detect aggressive and bullying behavior on Twitter,
as summarized in Figure 1, involves the following steps: (1) data
collection, (2) preprocessing of tweets, (3) sessionization, (4) ground
truth building, (5) extracting user-, text-, and network-level features,
(6) user modeling and characterization, and (7) classication.
Data Collection. Our rst step is to collect tweets and, naturally,
there are a few possible ways to do so. In this paper, we rely on
Twitter’s Streaming API, which provides free access to 1% of all
tweets. The API returns each tweet in a JSON format, with the
content of the tweet, some metadata (e.g., creation time, whether it
is a reply or a retweet, etc.), as well as information about the poster
(e.g., username, followers, friends, number of total posted tweets).
Preprocessing. Next, we remove stop words, URLs, and punctua-
tion marks from the tweet text and perform normalization – i.e., we
eliminate repetitive characters; e.g., the word “yessss” is converted
to “yes”. This step also involves the removal of spam content, which
can be done using a few dierent techniques relying on tweeting
behavior (e.g., many hashtags per tweet) and/or network features
(e.g., spam accounts forming micro-clusters) [18, 55].
Sessionization. Since analyzing single tweets does not provide
enough context to discern if a user is behaving in an aggressive or
bullying way, we group tweets from the same user, based on time
clusters, into sessions and analyze them instead of single tweets.
Ground Truth. We build ground truth (needed for machine learn-
ing classication, explained next) using human annotators. For this
(a) Followers distribution. (b) Hashtags distribution.
(c) Sentiment distribution. (d) Similarity distribution.
Figure 2: CDF of (a) Followers, (b) Hashtags, (c) Avg. senti-
ment, (d) Portion of user’s posts with similarity above 0.8.
we use a crowdsourced approach, by recruiting workers who are
provided with a set of tweets from a user, and are asked to classify
them according to predened labels. If such an annotated dataset
is already available, this step can be omitted.
Feature Extraction. We extract features from both tweets and
user proles. More specically, features can be user-, text-, or
network-based; e.g., the number of followers, tweets, hashtags, etc.
Classication. The nal step is to perform classication using
the (extracted) features and the ground truth. Naturally, dierent
machine learning techniques can be used for this task, including
probabilistic classiers (e.g., Naïve Bayes), decision trees (e.g., J48),
ensembles (e.g., Random Forests), or neural networks.
Scalability and Online Updates. An important challenge to ad-
dress is supporting scalable analysis of large tweet corpora. Several
of the above steps can be parallelized, e.g., over N subsets of the data,
on N cores (Figure 1). Also, one can use dierent modeling algo-
rithms and processing platforms (e.g., batch platforms like Hadoop
vs. stream processing engines like Storm) if data are processed in
batches or in a streaming fashion. Either way, some of the steps (e.g.,
annotation from crowd-workers) can be periodically executed on
new data, and the model updated to handle changes in data and/or
manifestation of new aggressive behaviors. Our pipeline design
provides several benets with respect to performance, accuracy,
and extensibility, as it allows regular updates of the model, thus
capturing previously unseen human behaviors. Moreover, we can
plug-in new features, e.g., as new metadata is made available from
the Twitter platform, or from new research insights. Finally, dier-
ent components can be updated or extended with new technologies
for better data cleaning, feature extraction, and modeling.
4 DATASET & GROUND TRUTH
In this section, we present the data used in our evaluation, and the
way we process it to build ground truth.
4.1 Data Collection
Data was collected between June and August 2016, gathering two
sets of tweets: (i) a baseline of 1M random tweets, (ii) a hate-
related, i.e., a set of 650k tweets collected from the Twitter Stream-
ing API using 309 hashtags related to bullying and hateful speech.
More specically, we build the list of 309 hashtags as follows:
we obtain a 1% sample of all public tweets in the given time win-
dow and select all tweets containing #GamerGate. The Gamergate
controversy [30] is one of the most well documented and mature,
large-scale instances of bullying/aggressive behavior that we are
aware of. It originated from alleged improprieties in video game
journalism, quickly growing into a larger campaign centered around
sexism and social justice [6]. With individuals on both sides of the
controversy using it, and extreme cases of cyberbullying and ag-
gressive behavior associated with it (e.g., direct threats of rape and
murder), #GamerGate serves as a relatively unambiguous hash-
tag associated with tweets that are likely to involve the type of
behavior we are interested in. We use #GamerGate as a seed for
a sort of snowball sampling of other hashtags likely associated
with bullying and aggressive behavior; we also include tweets that
have one of the 308 hashtags that appeared in the same tweet as
#GamerGate. Indeed, when manually examining these hashtags,
we see that they contain a number of hateful words or hashtags,
e.g., #IStandWithHateSpeech, and #KillAllNiggers.
Apart from the hate-related set, we also crawl a random set
of tweets to serve as a baseline, as it is less prone to contain any
kind of oensive behaviors. As noted in our previous works [5, 6],
there are signicant dierences among the two sets. To highlight
such social and posting activity dierences, we show the number
of followers, the hashtag usage, and the expressed sentiment. We
observe that users from the hate-related set have more followers
compared to the baseline set. This could be because users with
aggressive behavior tend to accumulate more popularity in their
network (Fig. 2a). Also, baseline users tweet with fewer hashtags
than users from the hate-related dataset (Fig. 2b), perhaps as the lat-
ter use Twitter as a rebroadcasting mechanism aiming at attracting
attention to the topic. Finally, the hate-related tweets contain more
negative sentiment since they are more oensive posts (Fig. 2c).
As expected, the hate-related dataset also contains activity of
users who may not be aggressive or hateful, and in fact, may be
driving metrics such as popularity in skewed ways. Therefore,
to understand nuanced dierences between aggressive or hateful
users with normal users, we investigate in more detail behavioral
patterns observed in this dataset in Section 5. More specically, we
analyze user behavior and prole characteristics based on labels
(normal, bully, or aggressive) provided by human annotators.
4.2 Preprocessing
We perform several steps to prepare the data for labeling and build
ground truth.
Cleaning. The rst step is to clean the data of noise, i.e., removing
numbers, stop words, and punctuations, as well as converting all
characters to lower case.
Removing Spammers. Previous work has shown that Twitter
contains a non-negligible amount of spammers [10], and proposed
Figure 3: Example of the crowdsourcing user interface.
a number of spam detection tools [18, 55]. Here, we perform a rst-
level detection of spammers and remove them from our dataset.
We use Wang et al.’s approach [55], relying on two main indicators
of spam: (i) using a large number of hashtags in tweets (to boost
visibility), and (ii) posting a large number of tweets highly similar
to each other. To nd optimal cutos for these heuristics, we study
both the distribution of hashtags and duplication of tweets. For
hashtags, we notice that the average number of hashtags within a
user’s posts ranges in 0 to 17. We experiment with dierent cutos
and after a textual inspection on a sample of spam posts, we set
the limit to 5 hashtags, i.e., users with more than 5 hashtags (on
average) per tweet are removed. Next, we estimate the similarity of
a user’s tweets via the Levenshtein distance [35], i.e., the minimum
number of single-character edits needed to convert one string into
another, averaging it out over all pairs of the user’s tweets. For a
user’s x tweets, we calculate the average intra-tweet similarity over
a set of n similarity scores, where n = x (x − 1)/2. If the average
intra-tweet similarity is above 0.8, we exclude the user and their
posting activity. Figure 2d shows that about 5% of users have a high
percentage of similar posts and are removed from our dataset.
4.3 Sessionization
Cyberbullying usually involves repetitive actions, thus, we aim to
study users’ tweets over time. Inspired by Hosseinmardi et al. [25]
– who consider a lower threshold of comments for media sessions
extracted from Instagram to be presented in the annotation process
– we create, for each user, sets of time-sorted tweets (sessions) by
grouping tweets posted close to each other in time.
First, we remove users who are not signicantly active, i.e., tweet-
ing less than ve times in the 3-month period. Then, we use a
session-based model where, for each session Si , the inter-arrival
time between tweets does not exceed a predened time threshold
tl . We experiment with various values of tl to nd an optimal ses-
sion duration and arrive at a threshold of 8 hours. The minimum,
median, and maximum length of the resulting sessions (in terms
of the number of their included tweets) for the hate-related (i.e.,
Gamergate) dataset are, respectively, 12, 22, and 2.6k tweets. For
the baseline set of tweets, they are 5, 44, and 1.6k tweets.
Next, we divide sessions in batches, as otherwise they would
contain too much information to be carefully examined by a crowd-
worker within a reasonable period of time. To nd the optimal
size of a batch, i.e., the number of tweets per batch, we performed
preliminary labeling runs on CrowdFlower, involving 100 workers
each, using batches of exactly 5, 5-10, and 5-20 tweets. Our intuition
is that increasing the batch size provides more context to the worker
to assess if a poster is acting in an aggressive or bullying behavior,
however, too many tweets might confuse them. The best results
with respect to labeling agreement – i.e., the number of workers
that provide the same label for a batch – occur with 5-10 tweets per
batch. Therefore, we eliminate sessions with fewer than 5 tweets,
and further split those with more than 10 tweets (preserving the
chronological ordering of their posted time). In the end, we arrive
at 1, 500 batches. We also note that we maintain the same number
of batches for both the hate-related and baseline tweets.
4.4 Crowdsourced Labeling
We now present the design of our crowdsourcing labeling process,
performed on CrowdFlower.
Labeling. Our goal is to label each Twitter user – not single tweets
– as normal, aggressive, bullying, or spammer by analyzing their
batch(es) of tweets. Note that we also allow for the possibility that
a user is spamming and has passed our basic spam ltering. Based
on previous research [19, 46, 52], workers are provided with the
following denitions of aggressive, bullying, and spam behaviors:
• aggressor: someone who posts at least one tweet or retweet
with negative meaning, with the intent to harm or insult other
users (e.g., the original poster of a tweet, a group of users, etc.);
• bully: someone who posts multiple tweets or retweets (≥2) with
negative meaning for the same topic and in a repeated fashion,
with the intent to harm or insult other users (e.g., the original
poster of a tweet, a minor, a group of users, etc.) who may not
be able to easily defend themselves during the postings;
• spammer: someone who posts texts of advertising / marketing
or other suspicious nature, such as to sell products of adult
nature, and phishing attempts.
CrowdFlower Task. We redirect employed crowd workers to an
online survey tool we developed. First, they are asked to provide
basic demographic information: gender, age, nationality, education
level, and annual income. In total, 30% are female and 70% male,
while their claimed educational level is spread between secondary
education (18.4%), bachelor degree (35.2%), master (44%), and PhD
(2.4%). One third (35.5%) claim an income level below e10k, ∼20%
between e10k-e20k and the rest between e20k-e100k. Regarding
age, 27% are 18-24, 30% are 25-31, 21% are 32-38, 12% are 39-45,
and the remainder above 45 years old. They come from 56 dif-
ferent countries, with signicant participation of users from USA,
Venezuela, Russia, and Nigeria. Overall, the annotators from the
top 10 countries contribute 75% of all annotations.
We then ask workers to label 10 batches, one of which is a
control case (details below). We also provide them with the user
prole description (if any) of the Twitter user they are labeling
and the denition of aggressive, bullying, and spammer behaviors.
Figure 3 presents an example of the interface. The workers rated
Type Feature
User avg. # posts, # days since account creation, veried account
(total: 10) # subscribed lists, posts’ interarrival time, default prole image?
statistics on sessions: total number, avg., median, and STD. of their size
Textual avg. # hashtags, avg. # emoticons, avg. # upper cases, # URLs
(total: 9) avg. sentiment score, avg. emotional scores, hate score
avg. word embedding score, avg. curse score
Network # friends, # followers, hubs, (d=#followers/#friends), authority
(total: 11) avg. power di. with mentioned users, clustering coecient, reciprocity
eigenvector centrality, closeness centrality, louvain modularity
Table 1: Features considered in the study.
the instructions given to them, as well as the overall task, as very
good with an overall score of 4 out 5.
Results. Overall, we recruit 834 workers. They are allowed to
participate only once to eliminate behavioral bias across tasks and
discourage rushed tasks. Each batch is labeled by 5 dierent work-
ers, and, similar to [25], [36], a majority vote is used to decide the
nal label. We receive 1, 303 annotated batches, comprising 9, 484
tweets in total. 4.5% of users are labeled as bullies, 3.4% as aggres-
sors, 31.8% as spammers, and 60.3% as normal. Overall, abusive
users (i.e., bullies and aggressors) make up about 8% of our dataset,
which mirrors observations from previous studies (e.g., in [28] 9% of
the users in the examined dataset exhibits bad behavior, while in [2]
7% of users cheated). Thus, we believe our ground truth dataset
contains a representative sample of aggressive/abusive content.
Annotator reliability. To assess the reliability of our workers, we
use (i) the inter-rater reliability measure, and (ii) control cases. We
nd the inter-rater agreement to be 0.54. We also use control cases
to ensure worker “quality” by manually annotating three batches of
tweets. During the annotation process, each worker is given a set
of batches to annotate, one of which is a randomly selected control
case: the annotation of these control cases is used to assess their
ability to adequately annotate for the given task. We nd 66.5%
accuracy overall (i.e., the percent of correctly annotated control
cases). More specically, 83.75% accuracy for spam, 53.56% for
bully, and 61.31% for aggressive control cases.
5 FEATURE EXTRACTION
In this section, we focus on user-, text-, and network-based features
that can be subsequently used in the modeling of user behaviors
identied in the dataset. Next, we detail the features from each
category, summarized in Table 1. To examine the signicance of
dierences among the distributions presented next, we use the two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, a non-parametric statistical test,
to compare the probability distributions of dierent samples. We
consider as statistically signicant all cases with p < 0.05.
5.1 User-based features
Basics. We experiment with various user-based features; i.e., fea-
tures extracted from a user’s prole. Features in this category
include the number of tweets a user has made, the age of his ac-
count (i.e., number of days since its creation), the number of lists
subscribed to, if the account is veried or not (i.e., acknowledged
by Twitter as an account linked to a user of “public interest”), and
whether or not the user still uses the default prole image. A repre-
sentative example is shown in Figure 4a, which plots the CDF of
the number of subscribed lists for each of the four behaviors we
(a) Lists distribution. (b) Sessions distribution.
(c) Interarrival time distribution. (d) URLs distribution.
(e) Hashtags distribution. (f) Sentiment distribution.
Figure 4: (a) Lists, (b) Sessions size, (c) Interarrival time, (d)
URLs, (e) Hashtags, and (f) Sentiment distribution.
examine (the maximum number of lists is 4, 327, but we trim the
plot at 500 for readability). The median (max) number of lists for
bullying, spam, aggressive, and normal users is 24 (428), 57 (3, 723),
40, (1, 075), and 74 (4, 327), respectively. We note the dierence in
the participation of groups from each class of users, with normal
users signing up to more lists than the other types of users.
Session statistics. Here, we consider the number of sessions pro-
duced by a user from June to August and we estimate the average,
median and standard deviation of the size of each users’ sessions.
Figure 4b shows the CDF of the median number of sessions for the
4 behavior classes. Comparing the distributions among the bullies
and aggressors to the normal users, we observe that the dierences
are not statistically signicant with D=0.16052 and D=0.14648 for
bully vs. normal, and aggressors vs. normal, respectively.
Inter-arrival time. Figure 4c plots the CDF of users posts’ inter-
arrival time. We observe that bullies and aggressors tend to have
less waiting time in their posting activity compared to the spam
and normal users, which is in alignment with results in [25].
5.2 Text-based features
For text-based features, we look deeper into a user’s tweeting ac-
tivity by analyzing specic attributes that exist in his tweets.
Basics. We consider some basic metrics across a user’s tweets: the
number of hashtags used, uppercase text (which can be indicative
of intense emotional state or ‘shouting’), number of emoticons, and
URLs. For each of these, we take the average over all tweets in a
users’ annotated batch. Figure 4d depicts the CDF of the average
number of URLs for the dierent classes of users. The median
value for bully, spam, aggressive, and normal users is 1, 1, 0.9,
and 0.6, respectively. The maximum number of URLs between
users also varies: for bully and aggressive users it is 1.17 and 2,
respectively, while for spam and normal users it is 2.38 and 1.38.
Thus, normal users tend to post fewer URLs than the other 3 classes.
Also, from Figure 4e we observe that aggressive and bully users
have a propensity to use more hashtags within their tweets, as they
try to disseminate their attacking message to more individuals or
groups.
Word embedding. Word embedding allows nding both seman-
tic and syntactic relation of words, which permits the capturing
of more rened attributes and contextual cues that are inherent
in human language. E.g., people often use irony to express their
aggressiveness or repulsion. Therefore, we use Word2Vec [32], an
unsupervised word embedding-based approach to detect seman-
tic and syntactic word relations. Word2Vec is a two-layer neural
network that operates on a set of texts to: 1) initially establish a
vocabulary based on the words included in such set more times than
a user-dened threshold (to eliminate noise), 2) apply a learning
model to input texts to learn the words’ vector representations in
a D-dimensional, user-dened space, and 3) output a vector rep-
resentation for each word encountered in the input texts. Based
on [32] 50-300 dimensions can model hundreds of millions of words
with high accuracy. Possible methods to build the actual model are:
1) CBOW (i.e., Continuous bag of words), which uses context to
predict a target word, and 2) Skip-gram, which uses a word to pre-
dict a target context. Skip-gram works well with small amounts of
training data and handles rare words or phrases well, while CBOW
shows better accuracy for frequent words and is faster to train.
Here, we use Word2Vec to generate features to better capture
the context of the data at hand. We use a pre-trained model with a
large scale thematic coverage (with 300 dimensions) and apply the
CBOW model due to its better performance regarding the training
execution time. Finally, having at hand the vector representations
of all input texts’ words, the overall vector representation of an
input text is derived by averaging all the vectors of all its comprising
words. Comparing the bully distribution with the normal one we
conclude to D=0.094269 and p=0.7231, while in the aggressive vs.
normal distribution comparison D=0.11046 and p=0.7024, thus in
both cases the dierences are not statistically signicant.
Sentiment. Sentiment has already been considered during the
process of detecting abusive behavior in communications among
individuals, e.g., [34]. To detect sentiment, we use the SentiStrength
tool [45], which estimates the positive and negative sentiment (on
a [-4, 4] scale) in short texts, even for informal language often used
on Twitter. First, however, we evaluate its performance by applying
it on an already annotated dataset with 7, 086 tweets [53]. The
overall accuracy is 92%, attesting to its ecacy for our purposes.
Figure 4f plots the CDF of average sentiment for the 4 user classes.
Even though we observe a distinction among the aggressive and
the rest of classes, this is not the case when comparing the remain-
ing three classes, where similar behavior is observed concerning
(a) Friends distribution. (b) Followers distribution.
(c) Reciprocity distribution. (d) Power dierence distribution.
Figure 5: (a) Friends, and (b) Followers distribution, (c) Avg.
distribution for Reciprocities, and (d) Power dierence.
the expressed sentiments. More specically, comparing the distri-
butions of the aggressive class with the normal, and bully with
normal, they are statistically dierent (D=0.27425 and D=0.27425,
respectively). We also attempt to detect more concrete emotions,
i.e., anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise based on the ap-
proach presented in [7]. Comparing the distributions of the abusive
classes with the normal, in most of cases we observe no statisti-
cal dierence. For anger, even though the aggressive and normal
distributions are statistically dierent (D=0.21515), the bully and
normal users are not (D=0.080029 and p=0.88).
Hate and Curse words. Additionally, we wanted to specically
examine the existence of hate speech and curse words within tweets.
For this purpose, we use the Hatebase database (HB) [22], which is a
crowdsourced list of hate words. Each word in the HB is additionally
scored on a [0, 100] scale indicating how hateful the word is. Finally,
a list of swear words [37] is also used in a binary fashion; i.e.,
we set a variable to true if a tweet contained any word in the
list, and false otherwise. Even though these lists can be useful in
categorizing general text as hateful or aggressive, they are not well
suited for classifying tweets as they are short and typically include
modied words, URLs and emoticons. Overall, we nd that bully
and aggressive users have a minor bias towards using such words,
but they are not signicantly dierent from normal users’ behavior.
5.3 Network-based features
Twitter social network plays a crucial role in diusion of useful
information and ideas, but also of negative opinions, rumors, and
abusive language (e.g., [26, 39]). We study the association between
aggressive or cyberbullying behavior and the position of users in the
Twitter network of friends and followers. The network is comprised
of about 1.2M users and 1.9M friend (i.e., someone who is followed
by a user) or follower (i.e., someone who follows a user) edges, with
4.934 eective diameter, 0.0425 average clustering coecient, and
24.95% and 99.99% nodes in the weakest and largest component,
respectively. Users in such a network can have a varying degree of
embeddedness with respect to friends or followers, reciprocity of
connections, connectivity with dierent parts of the network, etc.
Popularity. The popularity of a user can be dened in dierent
ways. For example, the number of friends or followers (out- or in-
degree centrality), and the ratio of the two measures (since Twitter
allows users to follow anyone without their approval, the ratio of fol-
lowers to friends can quantify a user’s popularity). These measures
quantify the opportunity for a user to have a positive or negative
impact in his ego-network in a direct way. Figures 5a and 5b indi-
cate that bullies have fewer friends and followers than the other
user categories, with normal users having the most friends.
Reciprocity. This metric quanties the extent to which users
reciprocate the follower connections they receive from other users.
The average reciprocity in our network is 0.2. Figure 5c shows that
the user classes considered have dierent distributions, with the
bully and aggressive users being more similar (i.e., higher number of
reciprocities) than the normal or spammers. Reciprocity as a feature
has also been used in [24], but in an interaction-based graph using
likes in posts. Here, we investigate the fundamental reciprocity in
Twitter friendship; the rst to do this in the context of bullying.
Power Dierence. A recent study [41] found that the emotional
and behavioral state of victims depend on the power of their bullies,
e.g., more negative emotional experiences were observed when
more popular cyberbullies conducted the attack, and the high power
dierence with respect to status in the network has been shown
to be a signicant characteristic of bullies [12]. Thus, we consider
the power dierence between a tweeter and his mentions. In fact,
a further analysis of a user’s mentioned users could reveal possible
victims or bystanders of his aggressive or bullying behavior. To this
end, we compute the dierence in power a user has with respect
to the users he mentions in his posts, in terms of their respective
followers/friends ratio. Figure 5d shows the distribution of this
power dierence (we note that the maximum power dierence is
20, but we trim the plot for readability). The dierence in power
between the aggressive (bully) and normal users is statistically
signicant (D=0.22133 and D=0.31676, respectively).
Centrality Scores. We also investigate users’ position in their
network through more elaborate metrics such as hub, authority,
eigenvector and closeness centrality, that measure inuence in their
immediate and extended neighborhood, as well as connectivity.
Hubs and Authority. A node’s hub score is the sum of the au-
thority score of the nodes that point to it, and authority shows how
many dierent hubs a user is connected with [29].
Inuence. Eigenvector centrality measures the inuence of a user
in his network, immediate or extended over multiple hops. Close-
ness centrality measures the extent to which a user is close to each
other user in the network. To calculate the last four measures, we
consider both the followers and friends relations of the users under
examination in an undirected version of the network. Figures 6a, 6b,
and 6c show the CDFs of the hubs (max value: 0.861), authorities
(max value: 0.377), and eigenvector (max value: 0.0041) scores for
the four user classes. We observe that bullies have lower values in
their hub and authority scores which indicates that they are not so
popular in their networks. In terms of inuence on their ego and
extended network, they have behavior similar to spammers, while
(a) Hubs distribution. (b) Authorities distribution.
(c) Eigenvector distribution. (d) Clustering coef. distribution.
Figure 6: Avg. distribution for (a) Hubs, (b) Authorities, (c)
Eigenvectors, and (d) Clustering Coecient.
aggressors seem to have inuence more similar to normal users.
We omit the CDF of the closeness centrality measure because we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are dierent.
Communities. Past work [20] showed that bullies tend to experi-
ence social rejection from their environment and face diculties
in developing social relations. We examine the usefulness of this
attribute and calculate the clustering coecient which shows a
user’s tendency to cluster with others. Figure 6d plots the CDF of
the clustering coecient among the four classes. We observe that
bullies, similar to the spammers, are less prone to create clusters
in contrast to aggressive and normal users. Finally, we compute
communities using the Louvain method [3] which is suitable for
identifying groups on large networks as it attempts to optimize the
modularity measure (how densely connected the nodes within a
cluster are) of a network by moving nodes from one cluster to an-
other. Overall, we observe a few communities with a high number
of nodes (especially the network core) resulting in a feature which
statistically dierentiates bullies vs. normal users (D=0.206), but
not aggressive vs. normal users (D=0.1166, p=0.6364).
6 MODELING AGGRESSORS & BULLIES
In this section, we present our eorts to model bullying and ag-
gression behaviors on Twitter, using the features extracted and the
labels provided by the crowdworkers as presented earlier.
6.1 Experimental Setup
We considered various machine learning algorithms, either proba-
bilistic, tree-based, or ensemble classiers (built on a set of classi-
ers whose individual decisions are then combined to classify data).
Due to limited space, we only present the best results with respect
to training time and performance, obtained with the Random Forest
classier. For all the experiments presented next, we use the WEKA
data mining toolkit and repeated (10 times) 10-fold cross valida-
tion [27], providing the relevant standard deviation (STD). We do
not balance the data to better match a real-world deployment.
Features selection. Most of the features presented in Section 5 are
useful (stat. signicant) in discriminating between the user classes.
However, some are not useful and are excluded from the modeling
analysis to avoid adding noise. Specically, we exclude the follow-
ing features from our analysis: user-based - veried account, default
prole image, statistics on sessions, text-based - average emotional
scores, hate score, average word embedding, average curse score,
and network-based - closeness centrality and Louvain modularity.
Tree-based classiers. Relatively fast compared to other clas-
sication models [42], tree classiers have three types of nodes:
(i) root node, with no incoming edges, (ii) internal nodes, with one
incoming edge and two or more outgoing edges, (iii) leaf node,
with incoming edge and no outgoing edges. The root and each
internal node correspond to feature test conditions (each test cor-
responds to a single feature) for separating data based on their
characteristics, while leaf nodes correspond to the available classes.
We experimented with various tree classiers: J48, LADTree, LMT,
NBTree, Random Forest (RF), and Functional Tree; we achieved
best performance with the RF classier, which constructs a forest
of decision trees with random subsets of features during the clas-
sication process. To build the RF model, we tune the number of
trees to be generated as 10, and the maximum depth unlimited.
Evaluation. For evaluation purposes, we examine standard ma-
chine learning performance metrics: precision (prec), recall (rec),
and weighted area under the ROC curve (AUC), at the class level and
overall average across classes. Also, the overall kappa (compares an
observed accuracy with an expected accuracy, i.e., random chance),
the root mean squared error (RMSE), which measures the dier-
ences among the values predicted by the model and the actually
observed values, and nally the accuracy values are presented.
Experimentation phases. Two setups are tested to assess the
feasibility of detecting user behavior: (i) 4-classes classication:
bully, aggressive, spam, and normal users, (ii) 3-classes classica-
tion: bully, aggressive, and normal users. This setup examines the
case where we lter out spam with a more elaborate technique and
attempt to detect the bullies and aggressors from normal users.
6.2 Classication Results
Detecting oensive classes. Here, we examine whether it is pos-
sible to distinguish between bully, aggressive, spam, and normal
users. Table 2a overviews the results obtained with the RF classier.
In more detail, we observe that the classier succeeds to detect
43.2% (STD=0.042) of the bully cases, which is fair enough consid-
ering the small number of bully cases identied to begin with (only
4.5% of our dataset). In the aggressive case, we observe that recall
is quite low, 11.8% (STD=0.078). Based on the confusion matrix
(omitted due to space limits), the misclassied cases mostly fall in
either the normal or bullying classes, which aligns with the human
annotations gathered during the crowdsourcing phase. Overall,
the average precision is 71.6%, and the recall is 73.32%, while the
accuracy is 73.45%, with 0.4717 kappa and 0.3086 RMSE.
Prec. Rec. AUC
bully 0.411 0.432 0.893
(STD) 0.027 0.042 0.009
aggressive 0.295 0.118 0.793
(STD) 0.054 0.078 0.036
spammer 0.686 0.561 0.808
(STD) 0.008 0.010 0.002
normal 0.782 0.883 0.831
(STD.) 0.004 0.005 0.003
overall (avg.) 0.718 0.733 0.815
(STD) 0.005 0.004 0.031
(a) 4-classes classication.
Prec. Rec. AUC
bully 0.555 0.609 0.912
(STD) 0.018 0.029 0.009
aggressive 0.304 0.114 0.812
(STD) 0.039 0.012 0.015
normal 0.951 0.976 0.911
(STD) 0.018 0.029 0.009
overall (avg.) 0.899 0.917 0.907
(STD) 0.016 0.019 0.005
(b) 3-classes classication.
Table 2: Results on 4- and 3-classes classication.
Classifying after spam removal. In this experimental phase, we
want to explore whether the distinction between bully/aggressive
and normal users will be more evident after applying a more so-
phisticated spam removal process in the preprocessing step. To
this end, we remove from our dataset all the cases identied by the
annotators as spam, and re-run the RF modeling and classication.
Table 2b shows that, as expected, for bully cases there is an im-
portant increase in both the precision ( 14.4%) and recall (17.7%).
For aggressors, the precision and recall values are almost the same,
indicating that further examination of this behavior is warranted in
the future. Overall, the average precision and recall of the RF model
is 89.9% and 91.7%, respectively, while the accuracy is 91.08% with
0.5284 kappa value and 0.2117 RMSE. Considering a 0.907 AUC,
we believe that with a more sophisticated spam detection applied
on the stream of tweets, our features and classication techniques
can perform even better at detecting bullies and aggressors and
distinguishing them from the typical Twitter users.
Discussion on AUC. ROC curves are typically used to evaluate
the performance of a machine learning algorithm [15] by testing
the system on dierent points and getting pairs of true positive (i.e.,
recall) against false positive rates indicating the sensitivity of the
model. The resulting area under the ROC curve can be read as the
probability of a classier correctly ranking a random positive case
higher than a random negative case. Our model performs well in
both setups (Tables 2a and 2b). In the aggressor case, even though
the recall value is low, the AUC is quite high because the false
positive rate is especially low, with 0.008 and 0.0135 for the 4-class
and 3-class classication, respectively. We note that avoiding false
positives is crucial to the successful deployment of any automated
system aiming to deal with aggressive behavior. Ideally, our classi-
cation system’s results would be fed to a human-monitored system
for thorough evaluation of the suspected users and nal decision
to suspend them or not, to reduce false positives.
Features evaluation. Table 3 shows the top 12 features for each
setup based on information gain. Overall, in both setups the most
contributing features tend to be user- and network-based, which
describe the activity and connectivity of a user in the network.
Balancing data. Based on [9], and similar to almost all classi-
ers, Random Forest suers from appropriately handling extremely
imbalanced training dataset (similar to our case) resulting in bias
towards the majority classes. To address this issue, we over-sample
(based on SMOTE [8], which creates synthetic instances of the
minority class) and under-sample (a resampling technique without
replacement) at the same time, as it has proven to result in better
Experiment Feature (preserving order)
4-classes #friends (11.43%), reciprocity (11.10%), #followers (10.84%)
#followers/#friends (9.82%), interarrival (9.35%), #lists (9.11%)
hubs (9.07%), #URLs (7.69%), #hashtags (7.02%)
authority (6.33%), account age (4.77%), clustering coef. (3.47%)
3-classes #followers/#friends (12.58%), #friends (12.56%), #followers (11.90%)
interarrival (11.67%), reciprocity (11.01%), #lists (9.57%)
hubs (8.41%), #hashtags (6.2%), #posts (6.01%)
account age (4.13%), #URLs (3.73%), power dierence (2.23%)
Table 3: Features evaluation.
Prec. Rec. ROC
bully 1 0.667 0.833
aggressive 0.5 0.4 0.757
normal 0.931 0.971 0.82
overall (avg.) 0.909 0.913 0.817
Table 4: Classication on balanced data.
active deleted suspended
bully 67.24% 32.76% 0.00%
aggressive 65.12% 20.93% 13.95%
normal 86.53% 5.72% 7.75%
(a) Status check on Nov 2016.
active deleted suspended
bully 62.07% 37.93% 0.00%
aggressive 55.81% 25.58% 18.60%
normal 85.01% 6.86% 8.13%
(b) Status check on Feb 2017.
Table 5: Distribution of users’ behaviors in twitter statuses.
overall performance [8]. Here, we focus on the 3-class experimen-
tation setup, i.e., without considering the spam user class. After
randomly splitting the data into 90% for training and 10% for test-
ing sets, we proceed with the balancing of the training set. The
resulting data distribution is 349, 386, and 340 instances for the
bully, aggressive, and normal classes, respectively. We note there
is no resampling of the test set. Table 4 shows the classication
results. After balancing the data, the classier detects 66.7% and
40% of the bully and aggressive cases, respectively, while overall,
the accuracy is 91.25%, with 0.5965 kappa and 0.1423 RMSE.
6.3 Twitter Reaction to Aggression
Recently, Twitter has received a lot of attention due to the increasing
occurrence of harassment incidents [51]. While some shortcomings
have been directly acknowledged by Twitter [50], they do act in
some cases. To understand the impact of our ndings, we make an
estimate of Twitter’s current eectiveness to deal with harassment
by looking at account statuses. Twitter accounts can be in one
of three states: active, deleted, or suspended. Typically, Twitter
suspends an account (temporarily or even permanently) if it has
been compromised, is considered spam/fake, or if it is abusive [1].
After our initial experiments, we checked the current status of
all labeled users in our dataset. The status check was performed
over two time periods: at the end of November 2016 and February
2017. Tables 5a, 5b show the break down of account statuses for
each label for the two time periods. From the more recent time
period (February 2017), we observe that the majority of “bad” users
in our dataset have suered no consequences from Twitter: 55.81%
of aggressive and 62.07% of cyberbullying accounts were still active.
In particular, suspension (Twitter-taken action) and deletion (the
user removing his account) statuses exhibit a stark contrast.
While 18.6% of aggressive users are suspended, no cyberbullying
users are. Instead, bullies tend to delete their accounts proactively
(∼38%). Comparing the statuses of aggressive users between the
two time periods, we see an increase (4.65%) in the percentage of
those suspended. This is in alignment with Twitter’s recent eorts
to combat harassment cases, for instance, by preventing suspended
users from creating new accounts [40], or temporarily limiting
users for abusive behavior [49]. However, in both time periods,
there are no suspended bully users. Again, bully users seem to
delete their accounts, perhaps in an attempt to prevent suspension.
Regardless of the reason, for these users we also observe a 5.17%
increase in deleted accounts between the two time periods. The lack
of suspension of bully users could because bullying often manifests
in a hidden fashion, e.g., within seemingly innocuous criticisms,
yet are repetitive (and thus harmful over time) in nature [31].
7 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Although the digital revolution and the rise of social media enabled
great advances in communication platforms and social interactions,
wider proliferation of harmful behavior has also emerged. Unfortu-
nately, eective tools for detecting harmful actions are scarce, as
this type of behavior is often ambiguous in nature and/or exhib-
ited via seemingly supercial comments and criticisms. Aiming
to address this gap, this paper presented a novel system geared
to automatically classify two kinds of harmful online behavior,
cyberaggression and cyberbullying, focusing on Twitter.
We relied on crowd-workers to label 1.5k users as normal, spam-
mers, aggressive, or bullies, from a corpus of ∼10k tweets (distilled
from a larger set of 1.6M tweets), using an ecient, streamlined
labeling process. We investigated 30 features from 3 types of at-
tributes (user, text, network based) characterizing such behavior.
We found that bullies are less popular (fewer followers/friends,
lower hub, authority, eigenvector scores) and participate in few
communities. Although they are not very active as per number
of posts overall, when they do become active, they post more fre-
quently than typical users, and do so with more hashtags, URLs,
etc. Based on the analysis in [5] they also are older Twitter users
based on their account age.
Aggressive users show similar behavior to spammers in terms
of number of followers, friends, and hub scores. Similar to bullies,
they also do not post a lot of tweets, but exhibit a small response
time between postings, and often use hashtags and URLs in their
tweets. They also tend to have been on Twitter for a long time,
like bullies. However, their posts seem to be more negative in
sentiment than bullies or normal users. On the other hand, normal
users are quite popular with respect to number of followers, friends,
hubs, authorities. They participate in many topical lists, and use
few hashtags and URLs. These observations are in line with the
intuition that bully and aggressive users tend to attack, in rapid
fashion, particular users or groups they target, and do so in short
bursts, with not enough duration or content to be detected by
Twitter’s automated systems. In general, we nd that aggressive
users are more dicult to characterize and identify using a machine
learning classier than bullies, since sometimes they behave like
bullies, but other times as normal or spam users.
We showed that our methodology for data analysis, labeling, and
classication can scale up to millions of tweets, while our machine
learning model built with a Random Forest classier can distinguish
between normal, aggressive, and cyberbullying users with high ac-
curacy (> 91%). While prior work almost exclusively focused on
user- and text-based features (e.g., linguistics, sentiment, member-
ship duration), we performed a thorough analysis of network-based
features, and found them to be very useful, as they actually are
the most eective for classifying aggressive user behavior (half of
the top-12 features in discriminatory power are network-based).
Text-based features, somewhat surprisingly, do not contribute as
much to the detection of aggression (with an exception of tweet
characteristics, such as number of URLs, hashtags, and sentiment).
Finally, we discussed the eectiveness of our detection method
by comparing prediction results of the examined users with the sus-
pension and deletion of their accounts as observed in the wild. We
found that bullies tend not to have been suspended, but instead, take
seemingly proactive measures and delete their accounts. Contrary,
aggressors are suspended more often than bullies or normal users,
which is in line with recent Twitter eorts to combat harassment
by preventing suspended users from creating new accounts [40] or
temporarily limiting users for abusive behavior [49].
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